the stark polarities that may be generated at the national level as well.
Unusually for a single area of scientific governance, HESC science has produced politicisation right across the international, regional and national policy domains.
Why is this and what are the forces driving the mobile politics of the field? In addressing these questions, the paper begins with the relationship between science and economics. How is the relationship between the ambitions of science, the promise of HESCs and the economics of their development constructed? For medical science to move from the bench to the clinic, it has to secure the support of both venture capitalists and companies prepared to commit resources on the basis of faith in a future, and perhaps distant, therapeutic product. Should such faith be lacking, governments have the option of providing bridging investment in anticipation of the health consumer demand that may be stimulated by the potential stem cell technologies, and the economic benefits that could accrue to those in control of the technological supply. Through their choices on the support they give, or do not give, to HESC science in terms of investment and financial regulation, states have the ability to create a global framework of incentives and penalties to which both scientists and transnational companies may respond.
But consumer support for the research and development of new health technologies is dependent on considerably more than the anticipated health gain provided by such technologies. Markets are influenced by national and regional cultures that may not be sympathetic to technologies that offend certain cultural values, particularly those associated with the iconic status of the human embryo. Indeed, as the experience of GM food and agriculture in the European Union ably illustrates, the unsophisticated handling of cultural sensitivities may produce unexpected waves of political opposition to swamp the apparent rationality of a technological innovation. In the case of HESC science, a range of cultural values support, oppose or are indifferent to its progress and these have to be politically negotiated by states and institutions with an interest in its promotion. A new governance function is required. Increasingly, though not always, it is bioethics committees that have seized the consequent political opportunity and employed formal ethical debate as the means for noting, organising and pronouncing on the cultural arguments stimulated by new science and technologies, particularly where human genetics and the human embryo are involved. 1 Still in the process of political evolution, bioethics is moving to a position of global influence. But it has its own internal divisions and responses to national political cultures that add an extra layer of complexity to its allotted task of reconciling scientific progress and cultural values.
The engagement between scientific, economic and cultural forces generates a global political dynamic that finds expression in a range of governance policies on HESC science. Such policies constitute a measure of the changing balance of power in HESC science both within and, to an extent, between nation states. In what ways is that balance shifting and who are the winners and losers? What global patterns are emerging as alliances are forged and policy lessons learnt?
Science and economics
It is the promise of the scientists engaged in the HESC field that their work will lead to therapies capable of dealing with one of the major challenges of modern medicine: Whole organ transplants, such as for heart or kidney disease, will no longer rely on a supply of donors, neurodegenerative disorders such as Parkinson's, Alzeimer's disease and multiple schlerosis will become treatable, and patients with chronic conditions such as diabetes will be given new tissues capable of replacing the function of pharmaceutical regimes. Tissue engineering and regenerative medicine, it is argued, will be revolutionised.
Such a vision of the scientific future would appear at first glance to have considerable economic and political power. However, economists who have studied the issue of science funding offer two, subtly different, economic arguments as to why, left to the market, the level of investment in scientific research may be less than optimal. The first argument treats the product of such research, scientific knowledge, as a commodity with the characteristics of a public good: it is non-rival (may be shared amongst multiple users without diminishing their utility of consumption) and it is costly to exclude others from using it. 4 Since investors are unable to appropriate the entire value of basic scientific research, there will be 'under investment' in science. 5 However not all scientific knowledge can be treated as a public good: uncodified and unpublished, 'tacit' knowledge forms an important part of the scientific knowledge base but, embodied in skilled researchers, it is limited in supply. From the perspective of society as a whole, tacit knowledge will tend to be under-supplied, investors whose investments produce skilled researchers create benefits for the industry as a whole by creating a skilled labour pool -benefits that individual private investors will be unable to capture in full. These wider social benefits will not, therefore, be taken into full account when private investors decide how much to invest. 6 Governments can of course act to deal with the problem of underinvestment by the market. Some have decided that national investment in basic HESC research may provide an attractive platform for the development work of transnational companies looking for an appropriate home -to the economic benefit of both companies and government. Although the number of states that have pursued this option is as yet small, the beginnings of an international investment competition are clearly evident. Over the past five years the number of stem cell patent applications filed has steadily increased. However, even in the US, there remains at present a large gap between the claims of the science, on the one hand, and the views of the market on the ability of stem cell science to deliver tradable health products, on the other. Between 1994 and
2003, only about $300 million in private venture money flowed into the small number of US biotechnology companies carrying out research in the stem cell field (Table 3) .
Not only was this venture capital investment highly volatile, varying between $12.5
and $95.9 million per year, but it also constituted a mere one per cent of the total $300 billion venture capital flowing into biotechnology over that time. As might be expected, most of the investment went into companies doing research with adult, not embryonic, stem cells. 10 Without venture capital investment, or a similar scale of revenue from large pharmaceutical or medical device companies (critical to past success in biotechnology), small HESC biotechs will find it hard to make the transition into the product market. As yet the large corporations are maintaining a watching brief and keeping their power dry until both the science and the politics of the stem cell field are predictable enough to warrant substantial commitment.
Currently, the small size of firms means that most are restricted to developing technologies rather than products on the assumption that such technologies will have realisable value as the field grows and matures.
The hesitation of the venture capitalists is more than matched by the scepticism of stock market investors: over time, the fortune of stem cell stocks demonstrates a similar lack of investor faith in the future of the industry. To illustrate this point, As these data clearly show, the science and economics of HESCs are separated by the requirements of investor confidence in the context of an uncertain market. As one market commentator observed of stem cell companies: 'Products, not science, will make these companies profitable and provide returns to investors'. 13 Note: all three data series have been (re)indexed so that 31 July 1996 = 100. Source of data: Nasdaq.com. The disciplinary breakdown of the national and international bioethics committees provides a revealing insight into the political contribution of bioethics as a legitimating device. In contrast to science-based advice, whose claim to legitimacy is based on specific forms of expert knowledge, bioethics presents itself as both expert (on moral concerns) and as a vehicle for the representation of the citizen interest.
Individual members of bioethics committees (and those who organise and construct the committees) regard it as appropriate to describe themselves by their established disciplinary backgrounds. 21 Indeed, multi-disciplinarity is regarded as a strength and the absence of members specifically trained in bioethics is clearly not regarded as a weakness. In other words, the business of ethical regulation may require a particular expertise but it is one which, it is believed, can be acquired through the experience of committee work rather than through the formal acquisition of ethical knowledge.
Hence, a study of the bioethics committees of national biobanks found that out of a total membership of 88 only 11 (12 per cent) describe themselves as medical ethicists, philosophers or theologians. The dominating characteristics of membership background were medical science, particularly medical genetics, and law with 55 (62 per cent) members thus described. 22 A survey of EU countries by the European Commission of national bioethics committees in relation to HESC research and use provides some initial insights into the salience of the HESC issue and the political contribution of bioethics committees (Table 4) . 23 Of the 25 countries, two thirds (16 countries) had considered HESC science sufficiently important to require an opinion from their national ethics committee (or similar body) on the ethical and policy issues involved. In addition, two thirds had initiated, or intended to initiate, a public debate on the new technology.
Finally, half of the countries (13) had engaged in both expert and public discussion.
So far as the majority of the EU Member States are concerned, as a governance issue deserving serious consideration HESC science is clearly politicised. The ethical narrative of both expert and public discussions is in large part structured around the primary components of HESC science and the relative moral value that should be attached to the different components. This approach allows the creation of a continuum of policy options weighted in terms of their moral acceptability, or lack of it. Depending on their resolution of the particular cultural pressures to which they are exposed, countries, or more accurately their national ethics committees, reach different conclusions regarding the moral weight to be given to the HESC science components. The similarities of their conclusions are a tribute to the ability of transnational policy narratives to create a common agenda; their differences a reflection of the differential impact of local cultural values on the response to that agenda.
As indicated, the global struggle for control of the policy narrative can be analysed in terms of the moral status attached to the building blocks of HESC science. These are therefore simultaneously scientific and ethical objects and, as the politics of the field develops, constitute the primary units of cultural trading (Figure 2 ). compromises at the international level. 24 25 As yet the politics of cultural differences in this field appear as volatile as the economics of its future. Table 5 The Policy Option 4 is easily the most popular option with two-thirds of countries adopting it either through national law or through the ratification of the Council of Europe's Convention on human rights and biomedicine. 26 In the global politics of HESC science, the latter has proved to be an instructive example of how international conventions can exercise a shaping influence on the development of policy domains.
A product of the international network of bioethicist committees, its content mirrors that of UNESCO's Universal declaration on the human genome and human rights. 
Conclusions
The global politics of HESC science are driven by the several polarities of its immense promise and uncertainty, its economic potential and risk, and its cultural attractions and challenges. Confronted by these potent combinations, and aware that the field of genetics has a history of political entrapment, governments have thus far steered a wary course. But the nature of international political competition generates a dynamic that does not always resonate easily with the tenets of cautious rationalism.
Despite the distance between the contemporary science and its practical therapeutic application, the volatility of the stem cell market, the lack of interest of venture capitalists and the intensity of certain forms of cultural opposition, states are on the whole moving towards policies that are more rather than less supportive of this new field. In the regulatory domain, the formation of policies has been facilitated by the development of a sophisticated form of cultural trading where the value of the human embryo and its associated HESC product has been divided into a number of sub-units for the purposes of political negotiation and exchange. In support of this, national and international bioethics committees have helped develop an ethical language capable of facilitating the political debate and legitimising subsequent policy decisions and, in so doing, have promoted a novel, if still emergent, form of global governance.
However, despite the overall movement of governments towards policies that favour rather than inhibit the development of HESC science, the conflict over the political future of the area is not always so readily resolved. The continuing stalemates over HESC science in the UN and EU arenas, both a product of at least four years debate, and the resistance of the President's Bioethics Committee to stem cell science illustrate the policy immobility and tensions that cultural politics can produce. As is often the case, much will depend on the contribution of the United States, divided as it presently is between the restriction of federal research to the 64 approved HESC lines created before 9 August 2001 and the commitment of some states, notably California, to Policy Option 5. Home to a fair proportion of the world's HESC scientists, the majority of the stem cell companies, and a rapidly expanding amount of public funding fuelled by inter-US state competition, the US has a natural advantage. How far it will be able to retain that advantage in the face of growing international competition from Asian countries such as China, India, Singapore and South Korea unencumbered with cultural constraints remains to be seen. 
